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Abstract: The Republic of Serbia is a state overburdened with complex issues 
regarding its political transformation. These problems are a consequence of 
the dynamic changes which have occurred over the last 30 years. It should be 
remembered that Serbia underwent a transformation from an authoritarian 
to a democratic state in a relatively short period of time. Unfortunately, these 
dynamic political, economic, and social modifications coincided with serious 
systemic changes and this had an adverse impact on Serbian democracy. The 
political problems which directly influence the process of democratization are 
becoming more and more visible over time. One such problem is undoubt-
edly the fact that state power is in the hands of one political party: the Serbian 
Progressive Party. For states going through a transformation, such a concen-
tration of power could have negative effects on the quality of democracy. This 
article evaluates the non-democratic trends in Serbia which stem from the 
strengthening of the Serbian Progressive Party, especially on the level of state 
power. The article also suggests that this development might lead to Serbia 
being categorized as a country which has become stuck in the so-called grey 
zone of democratization.
Keywords: Republic of Serbia, Serbian Progressive Party, political transforma-
tion, democratization, non-democratic trends
Streszczenie: Republika Serbii jest państwem obciążonym wielopoziomowy-
mi problemami związanymi z transformacją polityczną. Wynikają one między 
innymi z dynamiki zmian, jakie zaszły w ostatnim trzydziestoleciu, a zwłaszcza 
po 2000 r., oraz ze specyfiki serbskiej państwowości. Warto przypomnieć, że 
Serbia w stosunkowo krótkim okresie przeszła transformację z państwa au-
torytarnego do demokratycznego. Niestety dynamiczne zmiany polityczne 
i gospodarczo-społeczne zbiegły się z poważnymi przeobrażeniami ustro-
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jowymi, które w sposób negatywny wpłynęły na jakość serbskiej demokracji. 
Z upływem lat coraz bardziej uwidaczniają się problemy polityczne, mające 
bezpośrednie przełożenie na proces demokratyzacji. Niewątpliwe jed-
nym z nich jest skumulowanie władzy państwowej przez jedną opcję 
polityczną – Serbską Partię Postępową. Należy podkreślić, że w państwach 
transformujących się monopolizacja władzy może mieć negatywny wpływ 
na jakość demokracji. Niekiedy może również powodować proces odwrotny, 
tzn. odchodzenia od demokracji w kierunku reżimu hybrydowego. W artykule 
podjęto próbę oceny tendencji niedemokratycznych w Serbii, wynikających 
między innymi z umocnienia się w ostatnich latach, zwłaszcza w organach 
władzy państwowej, przedstawicieli Serbskiej Partii Postępowej. Poczyniono 
również spostrzeżenie, że zjawisko to może oznaczać zakwalifikowanie Serbii 
do grupy państw, które utknęły w tzw. szarej strefie demokratyzacji.
Słowa kluczowe: Republika Serbii, Serbska Partia Postępowa, transformacja 
polityczna, demokratyzacja, tendencje niedemokratyczne
Introduction
The process of Serbian democratization dates back to the beginning 
of the 21st century. The chief impetus for the political, economic, and 
social changes was the collapse of Slobodan Milošević’s regime in 
the year 2000. This long-term leader lost the presidential elections, 
while his party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), lost its parlia-
mentary majority in the 2000 elections. In the 1990s, Serbia was 
involved in several armed conflicts with neighboring nations, in-
cluding Croatia and Bosnia. This is why, after the fall of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, some of the newly formed countries 
were forced to live with constant tension and crisis. The Republic 
of Serbia was one such case. Only after the year 2000 was the di-
rection reversed from a conflictual political culture to a consensual 
one. Politicians from the Democratic Opposition of Serbia initiated 
far-reaching changes which undoubtedly drew Serbia closer to the 
political, economic, and social models of Western Europe. Unfor-
tunately, this process was interrupted by issues relating to Kosovo. 
During that period, the Serbs decided to foster relations with Rus-
sia and these finally reached the status of a strategic partnership in 
2013. Cementing this relationship with Russia was a direct conse-
quence of political changes in Serbia because the most important 
political institutions had been taken over by politicians from the 
Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).
At the same time, Serbia was developing relations with the Euro-
pean Union, which opened accession negotiations in January 2014. 
It is clearly visible how double-tracked and unpredictable Serbian for-
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eign policy is and that this approach plays an important role in such 
an unstable region as the Balkans. It is equally clear that the SNS is 
responsible for this political direction. The party was established in 
2008 by a group of parliamentary members previously associated with 
the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). From 2012 to 2017, the founder of 
the aforementioned party, Tomislav Nikolić, was also the president 
of the Republic of Serbia. At the same time the leader of the SNS, 
Aleksandar Vučić, also managed to strengthen his position. He sub-
sequently became the prime minister and then the Serbian president 
on May 31, 2017. Unfortunately, the consolidation of the SNS in the 
political arena also increasingly raises doubts about the further de-
mocratization of Serbia. What is more, there are some visibly non-
democratic trends in the way the state functions. Nevertheless, this 
problem still requires a wider perspective. On one hand, the Repub-
lic of Serbia is undergoing a political transformation. Frequent struc-
tural, political, economic, and social changes make it impossible to 
treat the Serbian regime as a unified democratic state. When facing 
such circumstances, any political system would be constantly prone 
to lurching towards either a hybrid or an authoritarian regime. Two 
decades is clearly not long enough for Serbia to become a democrat-
ic state similar to Western or Central European countries, especially 
bearing in mind that in the 1990s it was still under an authoritarian 
regime. On the other hand, to judge the quality of a democracy one 
must adopt a particular perspective whilst avoiding exaggerated ste-
reotypes. In the Serbian case, such an analysis is particularly chal-
lenging mostly because of its low international prestige and as yet 
unresolved fundamental problems, for instance, the territorial in-
tegrity of the state.
When considering the issue of political transformation in Serbia, we 
should ask ourselves one question which is directly related to Thomas 
Carothers’ paradigm: is the Republic of Serbia stuck in the so-called 
grey zone of democratization? The central thesis of this work comes 
down to the idea that for several years, especially since 2015, Serbia 
has been witnessing visible and growing non-democratic trends which 
hinder the process of democratization.
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1. Political transformations in the Republic  of Serbia – an outline
In order to analyze the quality of Serbian democracy, one should re-
fer to the political changes which took place after the year 2000.1 The 
beginning of the 21st century was truly ground-breaking for the Serbs, 
and the political revolution which occurred at that time defined the 
future of their country.2 The key event was Slobodan Milošević’s loss 
in the presidential elections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is 
significant that Milošević was removed from office after several years 
of having full control over the country.3 Another remarkable change 
was the victory of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) in the 
parliamentary elections (December 23, 2000). Public support for the 
Socialist Party of Serbia, which had ruled the country since 1990, fell 
significantly and the party lost the election. As a result, in 2000 and 
2001 the most important state institutions were led by politicians 
with a democratic background.4 Their fundamental aim was to break 
the connection with the regime and carry out radical reforms of the 
political, economic, and social systems of the state.5 Despite having 
a coherent ideology, the coalition, which included the Democratic 
Party (DS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), fell apart in the 
middle of 2003. Nevertheless, this brief period in which it ruled the 
country deserves praise as it marked the beginning of the democrati-
zation process for Serbia.6
In the following years, the process of democratization continued 
but Serbia also went through some serious structural transforma-
tion. In 1992 the Republic of Serbia along with Montenegro formed 
1 N. Zakošek, ‘Democratization, State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia’, Democ-
ratization, no. 15 (3), 2008, pp. 593-596.
2 As wrote T. Carothers a small number of ‘transitional countries’ have moved away from au-
thoritarian rule and their political trajectory was unclear after 2000. Serbia was one of these 
states. T. Carothers, ‘The End of Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, no. 13 (1), 2002, p. 14.
3 F. Milačić, ‘A painful break or agony without end? The stateness problem and its influence on 
democratization in Croatia and Serbia’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, no. 17 (3), 2017, 
pp. 372-378.
4 M. Spoerri, ‘Crossing the line: partisan party assistance in post-Milošević Serbia’, Democratiza-
tion, no. 17 (6), 2010, p. 1114.
5 D. Kostovicova, ‘Civil society and post-communist democratization: Facing a double challenge 
in post Milošević Serbia’, Journal of Civil Society, no. 2 (1), 2006, pp. 28-32.
6 B. Stahl, ‘Another strategic accession? The EU and Serbia (2000-2010)’, Nationalities Papers, no. 
41 (3), 2013, p. 455.
177
Yearbook of  the  Ins t i tu te  of  East-Centra l  Europe •  Volume 18 (2020)  •  I s sue 3
The Republic of Serbia: Stuck in the grey zone of democratization?
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which in 2003 was transformed 
into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. However, after three 
years this loose federation broke up and two independent countries 
were born. The year 2008 brought other problems, not least that the 
Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo declared independence.7 
This event played a tremendously important role in the transforma-
tion of the Republic of Serbia, and its impact on Serbian politics will 
surely continue. The failure to maintain the state’s territorial integ-
rity as well as problems cooperating with the ICTY caused a shift in 
the political views and social mood of Serbs.8 As a result, support for 
the government under Koštunica fell and so did pro-democratic and 
pro-European feelings.
The first important sign of imminent change was the presidential 
election of 2004, when Boris Tadić, a Democratic Party candidate, 
narrowly beat Tomislav Nikolić, a Serbian Radical Party politician. In 
the next presidential elections in 2008, the margin between Tadić and 
Nikolić became even narrower, but Tadić won again. Tomislav Nikolić 
finally beat Tadić in the 2012 election. The political competition be-
tween the parties became more dynamic and diverse. In the parlia-
mentary elections of 2003, the SRS won the majority of votes (27.6%), 
while the existing DOS coalition received rather lukewarm support 
in comparison to the year 2000 (the Democratic Party of Serbia and 
the Democratic Party took 17.7% and 12.5% of the votes, respectively).9 
Nevertheless, in spite of the SRS’s victory, a governmental coalition 
was formed by the DSS. The government of Vojislav Koštunica faced 
a very complicated and difficult time for the Serbian state and did not 
complete its full term. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, the SRS 
obtained the best result once again (28.6%), while the Democratic Par-
ty achieved a significant growth in popularity (22.7%). The DSS and 
7 W. Hebda, ‘The issue of problematic states: Kosovo – a failed state? Political and economic 
analysis – outline of problem’, American International Journal of Social Science, no. 3(4), 2014, 
pp. 210-218.
8 J. Subotić, ‘Explaining Difficult States. The Problems of Europeanization in Serbia’, East European 
Politics and Societies, no. 24 (4), 2010, pp. 599-611.
9 Data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia Izbori za narodne poslanike Narodne 
skupštine Republike Srbije održani 28.12.2003. godine, Republički zavod za statistiku, Beograd 
[Иѕбори за народне посланике Народне скупштине Републике Србије одржани 28.12.2003. 
године, Републички завод за статистику, Београд], p. 7.
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New Serbia took third place (16.5%).10 Similarly to the previous term, 
the SRS joined the opposition and the government was formed by 
Koštunica. Unfortunately, 2007 and 2008 turned out to be even more 
challenging and the coalition in power broke up after the Kosovo cri-
sis. Therefore, early parliamentary elections had to be held again af-
ter only 16 months, but the Democrats managed to remain in power 
despite issues with Kosovo’s sovereignty. In the combined presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections of May 2008, the coalition with the 
Democratic Party won the election with 38.4% of the vote. Similar to 
the elections four years before, the SRS maintained its quite high level 
of support (29.4%).11 However, the political strength of the democrats 
had gradually declined.
The greatest challenge of that time was the economic recession, 
which directly influenced the living standards of Serbian citizens.12 
Although Mirko Cvetković’s government achieved some successes 
internationally and managed to serve its complete term in parliament 
(Skupština), it did not push through any serious economic reforms. 
The lack of constructive actions led to a serious deficit in the nation-
al budget, growth of public debt, decline in foreign investments, and 
unemployment of over 20%.13 No progress was made in terms of Ko-
sovo’s status, thus discrediting the politics of the Democratic Party. 
This resulted in a rapid decline in support for the government and led 
to the alternation of power: only four years after the SNS was founded 
it won the parliamentary elections of 2012 with 24% of the vote. It is 
worth noting that the SNS was set up by politicians who represented 
a central political faction in the SRS with Tomislav Nikolić as its leader. 
The coalition of democratic parties with the DS in the front line man-
aged to obtain significant support (22%). What came as a surprise was 
the rather impressive result of the SPS (14.5%), which had been highly 
10 Izbori za narodne poslanike Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije održani 21.01.2007. godine, Republički 
zavod za statistiku, Beograd [Иѕбори за народне посланике Народне скупштине Републике 
Србије одржани 21.01.2007. године, Републички завод за статистику, Београд], p. 7.
11 Izbori za narodne poslanike Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije održani 11.05.2008. godine, Republički 
zavod za statistiku, Beograd [Иѕбори за народне посланике Народне скупштине Републике 
Србије одржани 11.05.2008. године, Републички завод за статистику, Београд], p. 7.
12 P. Simić, ‘Serbia: Continuity and Change after 2012 Election’, International Relations Quarterly, no. 
4 (1), 2013, p. 7.
13 W. Hebda, Serbsko-chorwackie stosunki polityczne na przełomie XX i XXI wieku, Warszawa 2018, p. 124.
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discredited in the 1990s, while the SRS suffered a devastating defeat 
(4.6%).14 The results of the parliamentary elections reflected the need 
to create a coalition that was able to form a government. Prolonged 
negotiations led to a compromise between the SNS and the socialists. 
Finally, in July 2012, a coalition government was sworn in.
For the first time in ten years, the prime minister, Ivica Dačić, 
was a representative of the SPS. However, ministerial departments 
were dominated by the SNS, which had won the elections. With the 
SNS/SPS coalition and Nikolić’s win, Serbia’s more radical and con-
servative politicians appeared to have finally (re)gained power.15 The 
prime minister succeeded in boosting Serbian relations with West-
ern European countries and the European Union. A major role here 
was clearly the fact that in March 2012 the European Council granted 
Serbia the status of a candidate country.16 At the same time, Serbian 
relations with Russia were strengthened, which resulted in the estab-
lishment of a strategic partnership in 2013. The Serbian government 
expected economic investment from Russia and political support in 
the international arena. However, Serbia’s refusal to recognize Koso-
vo’s independence seemed to be the toughest challenge, especially in 
the context of negotiations with EU representatives. Although Ivica 
Dačić did not recognize the Kosovo authorities, he did not exclude 
the possibility of working on a common standpoint or agreement. The 
first meeting between the prime ministers of the Republic of Serbia 
and the Republic of Kosovo took place in October 2012 and was very 
significant.17 Still, not much was done to improve the economic situ-
ation in Serbia, so the country gradually sank into recession. The re-
construction of the government in 2013 and Mlađan Dinkić’s removal 
14 Izbori za narodne poslanike Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije, za predsednika Republike Srbije, 
Maj 2012, Republički zavod za statistiku, Beograd [Иѕбори за народне посланике Народне 
скупштине Републике Србије, за председника Републике Србије, Май 2012, Републички завод 
за статистику, Београд], p. 9.
15 J. Obradović-Wochnik, A. Wochnik, ‘Invalid Ballots and the “Crisis of Representative Democracy” 
Re-inventing Protest at the 2012 Serbian Elections’, East European Politics and Societies and Cul-
tures, no. 28 (4), 2014, p. 817.
16 E. Bujwid-Kurek, ‘EU aspirations of the Republic of Serbia – an overview’, Przegląd Europejski, no. 
40 (2), 2016, p. 21.
17 A. Hamilton, J. Šapić, ‘Dialogue-induced Developments on the Ground: Analysis on implemen-
tation of the EU-facilitated agreements on freedom of movement and trade between Kosovo 
and Serbia’, Group for Legal and Political Studies and Inter, Policy Report, no. 8, 2013, p. 10.
180
Yearbook of  the  Ins t i tu te  of  East-Centra l  Europe •  Volume 18 (2020)  •  I s sue 3
Wiktor Hebda
of the Minister of Finance and Economy did not help in any way. It is 
believed that these were the reasons for Ivica Dačić’s resignation at the 
end of January 2014. His decision must also have been influenced by 
conflicts between government ministers and the growing divergence 
of political opinion between the two parties.
On March 16, 2014, early parliamentary elections took place. A coa-
lition centered around the SNS won by promoting the slogan “A future 
that we believe in.” For the first time since 2000, the party achieved 
48% of the votes and was able to rule independently. The support for 
the SPS remained the same (about 13.5%). In the meantime, the Dem-
ocratic Party split into two competing fractions, which led to a vis-
ible drop in democratic support. Both coalitions received support of 
around 6%, which was much lower than had been expected before the 
elections.18 It should also be emphasized that the Democratic Party 
of Serbia did not manage to get a single member in parliament, even 
though a few years previously it had been a major political party in 
the country.19 This time the creation of a stable government did not 
involve tortuous negotiations. President Tomislav Nikolić appointed 
Aleksandar Vučić as prime minister. He was the leader of the SNS 
and had been the deputy prime minister in the previous government. 
Although “progressive” politicians obtained enough votes to rule in-
dependently, Vučić’s government also included politicians from the 
previous term, for instance from the SPS. The outgoing prime min-
ister, Ivica Dačić, was appointed the first deputy prime minister and 
became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Among its priorities, the gov-
ernment declared it would fight corruption and unemployment, attract 
foreign investors, instigate economic reforms, and strengthen rela-
tions with the EU. Over the next few years, most of these plans were 
not implemented but social support for Vučić and the SNS was still 
quite high. Such a state of affairs might have been easily explained by 
the fact that the opposition was fragmented and utterly powerless. In 
fact, neither the Democratic Party nor the Democratic Party of Ser-
18 Izbori za narodne poslanike Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije, Mart 2014, Republički zavod za 
statistiku, Beograd [Иѕбори за народне посланике Народне скупштине Републике Србије, Март 
2014, Републички завод за статистику, Београд], p. 9.
19 S. Orlović, ‘Parlamentarni izbori 2014: kontekst, akteri i ishodi’, Politički život. Časopis za analizu 
politike, no. 11, 2014, p. 43.
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bia was able to compete effectively with the SNS, which soon came to 
dominate Serbian politics. The ruling parties also exerted a growing 
influence on the media.
Despite being in a very favorable situation, the leader of the SNS 
decided to announce early parliamentary elections. The main reason 
behind such a strategy was supposedly an attempt to strengthen the 
SNS and prolong its time in power. The undertaking turned out to be 
effective: in the parliamentary elections of April 2016, the SNS defeated 
its competitors (48.2%) and was able to form a government indepen-
dently. The socialists came in second place (10.9%), while the Demo-
cratic Party was supported by only 6% of voters. The most surprising 
outcome of the elections was that the SRS came back to Skupština 
(8.1%).20 What came out of the elections was a reflection of strength-
ened political opinions among Serbs. On one hand, there was signifi-
cant and stable support for the SNS. On the other, the Democratic 
Party was losing support. Furthermore, the SRS started to play an in-
creasingly visible role in politics, while the beliefs of some Serbs (es-
pecially young people) were gradually becoming more radical.21 After 
the elections, Vučić formed his second government, which pursued the 
goals defined in the previous term. In 2017 Serbia witnessed another 
serious political change: Aleksandar Vučić, the previous prime min-
ister, celebrated victory in the presidential elections, which he won in 
the first ballot by gaining 55% of the votes. The leader of the SNS was 
undoubtedly the most influential politician in Serbia.
2. Non-democratic trends  in the Republic of Serbia after 2015
When discussing the issue of non-democratic trends in the Republic 
of Serbia, it is helpful to refer to some annual reports published in Na-
tion in Transit by Freedom House. This organization applies a scale of 
1 to 7, where 1 stands for the highest degree of democracy while 7 is the 
lowest. On this scale, Freedom House defines a consolidated democ-
20 Izbori za narodne poslanike Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije, Аpril 2016, Republički zavod za 
statistiku, Beograd [Иѕбори за народне посланике Народне скупштине Републике Србије, 
Април 2016, Републички завод за статистику, Београд], p. 9.
21 P. Petrović, I. Stakić, Extremism Research Forum. Serbia Report, British Council, April 2018, p. 36.
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racy (1-2.99), a semi-consolidated democracy (3-3.99), a hybrid regime 
or transitional government (4-4.99), a semi-consolidated authoritar-
ian regime (5-5.99), and a consolidated authoritarian regime (6-7). For 
instance, in 2018 among the countries which used to be a part of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, only Slovenia could boast 
of having a high rating of 2.07 (2nd place, a consolidated democracy. 
The remaining countries scored much worse: Croatia, 3.75 (ranked 
11th, a semi-consolidated democracy); Montenegro, 3.93 (ranked 12th, 
a semi-consolidated democracy); the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, 4.36 (ranked 15th, a hybrid regime); Bosnia and Herze-
govina, 4.64 (ranked 16th, a hybrid regime); and Kosovo, 4.93 (ranked 
19th, a hybrid regime) (In total were ranked 29 countries).22 Accord-
ing to the reports of Freedom House, Serbia had a downward trend 
in terms of democracy. In 2012, Serbia’s rating was 3.64 and this re-
mained unchanged over the next two years. Since 2015, Serbia’s score 
has constantly fallen: 3.68 in 2015, 3.75 in 2016, 3.82 in 2017, and final-
ly 3.96 in 2018 (13th place in the ranking).23 Nevertheless, these scores 
show that the Serbian political regime remains a semi-consolidated 
democracy. Bearing in mind the downward trend for Serbian democ-
racy, one can observe that there were some trends that hampered the 
democratization of the state. Some aspects of the political system ex-
perienced serious deterioration (national and local democratic gov-
ernance, independent media), which shows that the democratization 
process had not only slowed down but had even changed direction 
towards a hybrid regime.
Although the first signs of a weakening democracy were already 
visible in 2015, it should be underlined that at that time Vučić’s gov-
ernment did enjoy some success. For instance, it took steps towards 
Serbian membership of the EU and made an effort to normalize rela-
tions with Kosovo. In March 2015, Serbia concluded the first phase of 
accession negotiations with the EU (screening), while the first stages 
22 N. Schenkkan, ‘Nations in Transit 2018: Confronting Illiberalizm’, freedomhouse.org, 2018, p. 19, 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_NationsInTransit_Web_PDF_FINAL_2018_03_16.
pdf [2020-01-14].
23 M. Damnjanović, ‘Serbia’, freedomhouse.org, 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/
NiT2016%20Serbia_0.pdf, p. 1 [2020-02-12].
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of negotiation were opened in December of the same year.24 Regard-
ing Kosovo, there was some progress in implementing the decisions 
made in 2013 following the Brussels agreement.25 Unfortunately, these 
achievements in foreign politics did not improve the internal situation 
of the state, especially in terms of the competition between the ruling 
coalition (SNS, SPS) and the opposition. Aggressive attitudes in po-
litical debates were quite common and particularly visible in the SNS 
and the SRS leader, Vojislav Šešelj, who after having been imprisoned 
in the Hague in November 2014 resumed his political activity, which 
was full of hostility towards the EU, NATO and Croatia.26
In 2015, some voices started to say that early parliamentary elec-
tions were needed.27 It should be remembered that elections had taken 
place in 2014, therefore the last full 4-year term of Serbian parliament 
had occurred in 2008-2012. The call for yet another early election was 
related to growing support for the SNS and the chance of forming an 
independent government. Although early elections were not held in 
the end, there was definitely growing pressure on the media from SNS 
politicians, especially those critical of their actions. The government 
even tried to interfere in the running of some news agencies: for ex-
ample, the prime minister, Aleksandar Vučić, officially disapproved 
of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network’s (BIRN) journalists’ 
investigation into the ruling party’s actions.28 What is more, although 
the Serbian government privatized some national media outlets, the 
process of denationalization was never transparent and raised some 
difficult questions.29
24 Serbia 2016 Report, Commission Staff Working Document, European Commission, Brussels, 9 No-
vember 2016, SWD(2016) 361 final, p. 85.
25 ‘Serbia and Kosovo Reach Four Key Agreements’, Balkan Insight, 26 August 2015, http://www.bal-
kaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-kosovo-reach-four-key-agreements-08-26-2015 [2020-02-02].
26 ‘Nationalist Commemorations Threaten Balkan Reconciliation’, Balkan Insight, 8 July 2015, http://
www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/nationalist-commemorations-threaten-balkan-reconcilia-
tion-08-07-2015 [2020-02-04].
27 ‘Razmišljam o vanrednim izborima, neću da sedim u fotelji 15 godina i brčkam se po primorju’, 
Blic, 15 August 2015, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/584001/Vucic-Razmisljam-o-vanrednim-
izborima-necu-da-sedim-u-fotelji-15-godina-i-brckam-se-po-primorju [2020-02-05].
28 ‘Serbian PM Slams EU, Alleging BIRN Lies’, Balkaninsight.com, 10 January 2015, http://www.bal-
kaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-pm-slams-eu-alleging-birn-lies [06.02.2020].
29 I. Milutinović, ‘Media ownership and democratic capacity of transitional society: The case of Ser-
bia’, European Journal of Communication, no. 32 (4), 2017, p. 373.
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Without much of a doubt, one of the largest challenges that Serbia 
had to face due to accession negotiations with the EU was improv-
ing the judiciary.30 In 2015, the government finally drafted a reform 
which was intended to improve the organization and efficiency of 
the judiciary. The implementation program was planned for the fol-
lowing few years and was approved by the European Commission,31 
but Serbian society was hoping for some rapid changes. According 
to Dragomir Milojević, the chief of the Supreme Court of Cassation, 
the number of overdue lawsuits had increased from 100,000 to over 
3 million in just the first nine months of 2015.32 Despite the Serbian 
government’s constructive approach to judicial reforms, there were 
some legal breaches. One such violation was an attempt to remove 
Vladimir Vukčević from the position of war crimes prosecutor. This 
issue was directly related to the amendment of the Prosecution Act 
at the end of 2014. The ruling coalition expected Vukčević’s resigna-
tion as early as January 2015, but he was entitled to use his privileges 
for the next eleven months. The pressure imposed by the opposition, 
media and NGOs on SNS politicians enabled the prosecutor to con-
tinue his work. What is more, the Minister of National Defense, Bra-
tislav Gašić, also tried to pressure the Ombudsman, Saša Janković. At 
the beginning of 2015, Janković launched an investigation into illegal 
military surveillance of those who opposed the government, but the 
Serbian Ministry of National Defense was very skeptical about this. As 
a result, for the next few weeks the Ombudsman experienced threats 
and slander. The Serbian government also used political propaganda 
to raise fears about “external” enemies who reportedly posed a serious 
threat to the state. Pro-government media and SNS politicians spread 
the news about an attempt on the prime minister’s life, but this was 
never confirmed.33 Such a sociotechnical strategy achieved its intend-
30 V. Beširević, ‘Governing without judges: The politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia’, Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law, no. 12 (4), 2014, p. 978.
31 ‘Ustavne izmene u cilju nezavisnosti pravosuđa’, Euractiv, http://www.euractiv.rs/component/
content/article/204-pregovori-sa-eu/8776-ustavne-izmene-u-cilju-nezavisnosti-pravosua-.html 
[2020-02-05].
32 ‘Milojević pozvao sudije da predlažu najbolje za VSS’, dnevnik.rs, 16 October 2015, http://www.
dnevnik.rs/hronika/milojevic-pozvao-sudije-da-predlazu-najbolje-za-vss [2020-02-06].
33 ‘No Coup Attempt in Serbia, Says PM Vucic’, Balkan Insight, 12 January 2015, http://www.balkan-
insight.com/en/article/no-coup-attempt-in-serbia-says-pm-vucic-12-01-2015 [2020-02-06].
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ed outcome: it strengthened Aleksandar Vučić’s political position and 
increased support for the SNS.
The following year did not bring any changes. According to Free-
dom House, in 2016 Serbian democracy continued to deteriorate, as 
had been the case for the previous two years. Although some improve-
ment was visible, especially in the European integration process, a se-
ries of unfavorable events occurred which had an impact on election 
law, democracy and the freedom of the media. Consequently, the rat-
ing of democratic development in Serbia was exactly the same as in 
2005 (3.75).34 The first months of 2016 were dominated by a parliamen-
tary campaign, and speculation about early elections was confirmed in 
January 2016 when the Serbian prime minister announced that parlia-
mentary elections and local elections would take place concurrently 
in spring. Aleksandar Vučić explained that it was necessary to elect 
new representatives in order to push through reforms that would bring 
Serbia closer to the EU.35 However, this justification seems ground-
less, bearing in mind that his government had an absolute majority 
of votes in parliament. Scheduling early parliamentary elections only 
incurred unnecessary expense for the state budget. Surely, the SNS 
leader hoped to strengthen support for his party in light of the fact 
that he was increasingly supported by Serbian society. As has already 
been mentioned, the SNS won the parliamentary elections of April 24, 
2016 with a wide margin (48%) which let them form the government 
independently. In spite of this impressive victory, the second govern-
ment of Vučić was sworn in only in the middle of August.36 Because 
of the campaign (from January to April) and the prolonged process 
of forming the government (May to August), for eight months Serbia 
remained in a state of transition. This was rather detrimental to the 
state, especially in the context of the long-awaited reforms which were 
supposed to improve the country’s functioning.
34 M. Damnjanović, ‘Serbia...’, freedomhouse.org, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/
files/NiT2018_Serbia.pdf, p. 2 [2020-02-10].
35 ‘Pala odluka: Vučić: Idemo na izbore!’, Blic, 17 January 2016, http://www.blic.rs/ vesti/politika/
pala-odluka-Vučić-idemo-na-izbore/xspd6p5 [2020-02-12].
36 ‘Vučić i 19 ministara ovo je nova Vlada Srbije’, Blic, 11 August 2016, https://www.blic.rs/vesti/poli-
tika/vucic-i-19-ministara-ovo-je-nova-vlada-srbije/svyx0df [2020-02-12].
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In 2016, Serbia’s judicial system experienced a minor improvement. 
The number of overdue lawsuits fell and the government introduced 
regulations which guaranteed citizens a timely trial, but there were 
still many unresolved issues related to the judicial system. According 
to the Anti-Corruption Council (a governmental body), the Serbian 
judiciary remained under considerable political influence. Particularly 
visible was its dependency on the executive branch. The Belgrade Wa-
terfront scandal proved only too well how indolent and ineffective Ser-
bian prosecution was.37 Another example which raised doubts about 
the quality of the judiciary in Serbia was a situation which occurred 
after the expiration of Vladimir Vukčević’s mandate as the war crimes 
prosecutor. At the turn of 2014 and 2015, the ruling parties were try-
ing to dismiss Vukčević; however, since the SNS was under pressure 
from the media, Vukčević managed to serve his term until the very 
end. Surprisingly, after Vukčević stood down the Serbian parliament 
decided not to appoint a successor, even though the Prosecution Coun-
cil submitted appropriate applications. Not until May 2017 did the 
parliament manage to select a new war crimes prosecutor: Snežana 
Stanojković.38 Because of this delay, for about a year and a half, one of 
the most important positions in the judiciary remained unfilled. To 
make matters worse, the freedom of the independent media seemed 
to be threatened, especially those opposing the SNS. For instance, af-
ter the SNS victory in April in Vojvodina, the editors and journalists 
working for local radio and television were fired.39
37 The Belgrade Waterfront project was launched in 2014 with the aim of constructing exclusive 
apartments and a business service center on the right bank of the Sava River in Belgrade. This 
venture was co-financed and backed by the Serbian government. On the night of 24 April 2016, 
some private properties in Hercegovačka Street in the area of Savamala were illegally demol-
ished without the owners’ consent or any permission, by a group of masked men using heavy 
construction equipment. At first, the Belgrade authorities (including the mayor, Siniša Mali, also 
associated with the SNS) refused to mention the case and adamantly attempted to allay any 
suspicion of being involved in this outrageous situation. Finally, due to mounting social pres-
sure, the Serbian prime minister admitted that some “high local officials” were responsible for 
the demolition. See: ‘Vrh gradske vlasti odgovoran za Savamalu’, Politika, 8 June 2016, http://
www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/356732/Vučić-Gradske-vlasti-iza-rusenja-u-Savamali [2020-02-15].
38 ‘Snežana Stanojković novi tužilac za ratne zločine’, Blic, 15 May 2017, https://www.blic.rs/vesti/
politika/snezana-stanojkovic-novi-tuzilac-za-ratne-zlocine/g9m5zvl [2020-02-17].
39 ‘NUNS i NDNV predstavnicima OEBS-a i EU: Smene na RTV-u su otvoreni politički pritisak’, nuns.rs, 
19 May 2016, http://www.nuns.rs/info/news/27833/nuns-i-ndnv-predstavnicima-oebs-a-i-eu-
smene-na-rtv-u-su-otvoreni-politicki-pritisak.html [2020-02-02].
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Fighting corruption in both politics and the economy has been one 
of the most considerable challenges for Serbian society for many years. 
In fact, in the 2014 parliamentary elections the SNS promoted its cam-
paign with slogans about fighting corruption. What the ruling govern-
ment could boast about was the arrest in 2012 of Miroslav Mišković, 
a prominent businessman and the owner of Delta Holding. He was 
charged with corruption and his trial dragged on for over three years, 
but during that time he was out of prison on bail (12 million Euros). 
Finally, in June 2016 Mišković was found guilty of tax fraud and was 
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. However, one year later, after 
hearing his appeal the court acquitted him of some of the charges.40 
There was also very little progress in explaining inaccuracies regarding 
the denationalization of state properties. In 2015 the Anti-Corruption 
Council examined more than twenty cases, but the investigations did 
not seem to have much in common with the real charges.41 What was 
a novelty in the Serbian legislature was the Act on Informant’s Pro-
tection (Zakon o zaštiti uzbunjivača), which was implemented in June 
2015 and according to which people who reported cases of corruption 
and abuse were protected by the state.42 Moreover, the powers of the 
Anti-Corruption Agency and courts were expanded in terms of grant-
ing safety to informants. In 2015, the Anti-Corruption Agency inves-
tigated a case of nepotism in which Bratislav Gašić from the Ministry 
of National Defence was a suspect.43 Although it was proved that this 
SNS politician had abused the law, he never suffered any consequenc-
es for his wrongdoings. In fact, the number of people who were sen-
tenced for corruption remained at a dramatically low level, especially 
among public officials. Out of over 8,000 reported cases, only about 
1,000 corruption trials resulted in a sentence.44 This situation explains 
why Serbia is ranked so poorly in terms of corruption. According to 
40 ‘Miskovic acquitted on one charge, faces retrial on another’, b92.net, 27 October 2017, https://
www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes.php?yyyy=2017&mm=09&dd=27&nav_id=102422 [2020-02-22].
41 M. Damnjanović, ‘Serbia…’, 2016, p. 9.
42 ‘Long-anticipated Act on Protection of Whistleblowers is finally adopted’, schoenherr.rs, 5 Janu-
ary 2015, https://www.schoenherr.rs/news/legal-updates/legal-updates-detail/long-anticipated-
act-on-protection-of-whistleblowers-is-finally-adopted/ [2020-02-22].
43 ‘Bratislav Gašić u sukobu interesa’, javno.rs, 28 September 2015, https://javno.rs/istrazivanja/bra-
tislav-gasic-u-sukobu-interesa [2020-02-25].
44 Serbia 2016 Report…, p. 58.
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the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
in 2017, Serbia was in 77th position (out of 180 countries), behind such 
countries as Senegal, Oman, and Burkina Faso.45
A report, Democracy Index 2017 – Free speech under attack pub-
lished by The Economist Intelligence Unit (a British institution), eval-
uated political regimes in 165 countries through analyses of their 
election systems, pluralism, civil rights, government functioning, 
public involvement in politics, and political culture. These countries 
were later classified according to the type of regime on a scale of 1 to 
10: full democracy (8.01-10), flawed democracy (6.01-8), hybrid regime 
(4.01-6) and authoritarian regime (up to 4).46 In 2017, Serbia’s result 
was 6.41, placing it in 66th position behind such countries as Mongo-
lia (60th), Sri Lanka (62nd) and Guyana (63rd), but ahead of some of its 
neighbors, including Montenegro (83rd), the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (88th) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (101st). The score of 
6.41 indicated that Serbia was a flawed democracy at that time. How-
ever, since then this indicator has gradually fallen even lower (6.71 in 
2014, 6.71 in 2015, 6.57 in 2016), thus showing that Serbia is heading 
towards a hybrid regime.47 When analyzing this result, some huge 
discrepancies become obvious: the electoral system and pluralism 
in Serbia were rated the highest in the Democracy Index 2017 (8.25), 
showing that the process of choosing government officials is transpar-
ent and guarantees democratic competition as well as the possibility 
of alteration of power. In terms of civil rights and public involvement 
in politics, the scores were slightly lower at 7.35 and 6.11, respectively. 
These aspects of Serbian democracy reveal some weaknesses. One is-
sue is the low election turnout (56% for the parliamentary elections in 
2016, 54% for the presidential elections in 2017). Government func-
tioning and political culture received the lowest scores: 5.35 and 5.00, 
respectively.48 According to the authors of the report, the most fun-
damental weakness of Serbian democracy is the fact that Aleksandar 
Vučić holds the majority of the state power, while SNS politicians en-
45 Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/
news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017#table [2020-02-22].
46 Democracy Index 2017 – Free speech under attack, The Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 64.
47 Ibidem, p. 14.
48 Ibidem, p. 6.
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joy extensive influence. What is more, it is alarming that the opposi-
tion remains ineffective and is not really involved in any competition 
with the SNS. As a result, politicians from the ruling party dominate 
legislative and executive power and have increased their influence on 
the judicial branch, which unequivocally proves a violation of checks 
and balances, a fundamental aspect of democracy. The report criticized 
growing political pressure on the media and stated that to a large ex-
tent the Serbian media are dependent on politicians from the SNS.49 
The fact that the government continuously interfered with any me-
dia broadcast critical of their politics serves here as a vivid example.50
Conclusions
The Republic of Serbia is currently considered a democratic state, but 
one should bear in mind that in the 1990s it was a transformed au-
thoritarian communist regime which was more or less liberalized.51 
Therefore, it would be unwise to expect Serbia to reach the level of 
a unified democracy after a relatively short time. However, it should 
be noted that the dynamic political transformation which occurred 
after the year 2000 brought Serbia closer to the standards of Western 
Europe. Taking into consideration the range of problems the Serbs had 
to overcome, the Republic of Serbia has been successful in the process 
of democratization. In the 1990s the Serbs were involved in several 
armed conflicts (with Croats, Bosnians, Albanians), while their coun-
try was seriously damaged by NATO bombing. What is more, in the 
first decade of the 21st century Serbia had to deal with radical struc-
tural and political changes (Serbia and Montenegro were formed in 
2003; the federation fell apart in 2006; Kosovo claimed its independ-
ence in 2008). All these events occurred simultaneously with the eco-
nomic crisis in Serbia and this ultimately led to the pauperization of 
society.52 After the year 2000, however, Serbian politicians success-
fully reformed the state, which allowed Serbia to begin accession ne-
49 Ibidem, p. 30.
50 Ibidem, p. 56.
51 N. Zakošek, ‘Democratization, State-building and War…’, p. 597.
52 V. Džihić, D. Segert, ‘Lessons from “Post-Yugoslav” Democratization. Functional Problems of State-
ness and the Limits of Democracy’, East European Politics and Societies, no. 26 (2), 2012, p. 243.
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gotiations to the EU in 2014. Despite visible progress, the political, 
economic, and social systems need further reform. Serbian democ-
racy is not under threat, but for many years there have been some 
defects which definitely affect its quality. Unfortunately, recent years 
have revealed an accumulation of issues which seem to be related to 
the stronger position of the SNS.
Non-democratic trends in the Republic of Serbia since 2015 come 
down to a few problematic issues. One of them is the political strength 
of the SNS: for the last few years the president of Serbia has always 
been chosen from the SNS. The second executive body, the cabi-
net (government), has also been dominated by members of the SNS, 
which is a direct consequence of the distribution of seats in the Serbi-
an parliament. What is more, the party is also in charge of most local 
governments (157 out of 170 at the end of 2017).53 Unfortunately, the 
fact that power over the most important state and local institutions 
is held by representatives of the same political party will always have 
negative consequences, especially in a country which has been going 
through a process of democratization for only two decades. As a re-
sult, the ruling parties put pressure on judicial institutions as well as 
on the media, especially those critical of SNS policy. Another threat 
is corruption and connections between the political elite and crimi-
nals. Some positive changes have been visible in this aspect, but the 
transformation has been moving too slowly. It is also worrying that 
the opposition, which emphasizes the need to bring Serbia closer to 
Western European political standards, is fragmented. There are only 
a few parties with very little support. Recent years have also revealed 
the inefficiency of the Serbian courts. Unfortunately, long-awaited re-
forms are still being postponed, which adversely affects not only the 
judiciary but also the quality of Serbian democracy. This aspect has 
also revealed some non-democratic trends which interfere with the 
principle of checks and balances.
The reports used in this paper point to the fact that the regime 
of the Republic of Serbia is either a semi-consolidated democracy or 
a flawed or defective democracy, therefore there is a chance that non-
democratic trends will arise. The reports showed that some aspects of 
53 M. Damnjanović, ‘Serbia…’, 2018, p. 2.
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the Serbian system are still in need of fundamental reforms as with-
out them a consolidated democracy will remain out of reach. This 
dilemma concerns not only the political elite but, above all, Serbian 
citizens, who have been learning about democracy for only twenty or 
thirty years. Unfortunately, the process of forming a civil society could 
last for the next few decades. Let us, therefore, repeat the introduc-
tory thesis that there have been visibly non-democratic trends in the 
Republic of Serbia since 2015. However, this issue is nothing unusual, 
especially in the states of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia. Political transformation and democratization is a long-term 
process; therefore it might take Serbia many more years to change. 
What is more, it does not have to be a unidirectional process towards 
a consolidated democracy; quite the contrary, it might go in the op-
posite direction, thus leading Serbia to become a hybrid state. Thomas 
Carothers once claimed that only in a few countries does the process 
of transformation end in democracy; there can be serious obstacles or 
the process will be suspended, leading to a deadlock. A country gets 
stuck in the so-called grey zone, which makes it impossible to classify 
it as either fully democratic or definitively authoritarian.54 Surely, the 
Republic of Serbia has been in such a grey zone for the last few years. 
Its future political system will depend on the political elite, Serbian 
society, the geopolitical situation in both the Balkans and Europe, as 
well as numerous internal and external factors. However, in the years to 
come Serbian statehood will still be defined by non-democratic trends.
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